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F.H. Buckley, The Once and Future King: The Rise of Crown Government in America, 
New York, London: Encounter Books, 2014, pp. 424, $27.99
Reviewed by Ronald Rotunda
If you want to understand your own language, learn a foreign tongue. 
Similarly, if you want to understand the American system of government, learn 
what our intellectual kin—Great Britain and Canada—have done. As Professor 
F.H. Buckley notes, “He who knows only his own country knows little enough 
of that.”1 He is one of the few people who has thoroughly mastered the legal 
structure and history of all three countries.
When it comes to comparative law and comparative politics, it would 
be hard to fi nd a more qualifi ed or better-trained guide for the perplexed. 
Buckley holds a chaired professorship at George Mason University School of 
Law, in Virginia.2 He has also taught at Panthéon-Assas University, Sciences 
Po in Paris, the University of Ottawa Faculty of Law, the McGill Faculty of 
Law in Montreal, and the University of Chicago.3 He also practiced law for 
three years in Toronto.4 His fi rst law degree is Canadian (McGill University) 
and the second, American (Harvard).5 
His latest book6 is The Once and Future King: The Rise of Crown Government in 
America. By crown government, he means rule by a powerful central executive. 
At the time of our independence, the monarch, George III, was that fi gure. 
Now, the president of the United States is becoming that fi gure. He is Rex 
Quondam, Rex Futurus—the once and future king.
1. F.H. BUCKLEY, THE ONCE AND FUTURE KING 6 (Encounter Books 2014)(footnote omitted).
2. http://www.law.gmu.edu/faculty/directory/fulltime/buckley_francis (last visited May 15, 
2015).
3. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F.H._Buckley (last visited May 15, 2015). 
4. Id.
5. http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/fi les/faculty/cv/BUCKLEY_CV-20130123.pdf (last visited 
May 15, 2015).
6. Buckley is an unusually prolifi c writer with a wide range of interests. His other books are THE 
FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (ed., Duke 1999), THE MORALITY OF LAUGHTER 
(Michigan 2003), JUST EXCHANGE (Routledge 2005), FAIR GOVERNANCE (Oxford 2009), and 
THE AMERICAN ILLNESS (ed., Yale 2013).
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Our Constitution is the oldest written constitution in the world,7 yet that 
Constitution of 1787 is not the same today as it was over two centuries ago. 
Professor Buckley argues that we have gone through four constitutional 
stages, not only because of Supreme Court decisions but also because of the 
original decision of the framers to reject a parliamentary form of government. 
The framers were worried that Congress was the most dangerous of the three 
branches of government,8 so it sought to separate executive powers from 
the legislature so that the chief executive would be an important check on 
legislative abuse. Now, the greater risk of abuse lies with executive power.
We have moved from the presidency that the framers envisioned to the type 
of government they had rejected—virtual crown government. Buckley argues 
that parliamentary government is a better protection for our liberties. To 
substantiate his position, he takes us on a fascinating historical tour, starting 
with George III and the Constitutional Convention, and ending with the 
modern presidency under Bill Clinton, George Bush, and Barack Obama. It 
is a carefully written and thoroughly researched work (the endnotes comprise 
64 pages of this 385-page book). 
Along the way, we learn that the framers came much closer than we know 
to creating a parliamentary system. In fact, they thought that they had created 
a quasi-parliamentary system. The House of Representatives, the framers 
thought, would really choose the president because the presidential electors 
would not agree. While the prime minister can choose to call a new election 
and face the voters when he thinks it is propitious, the American president 
would have a fi xed term and must face reappointment every four years. 
However, what the framers envisioned is not what we have today.
Since 1787—and particularly in the past quarter-century—many countries 
have adopted written constitutions. And many of them have chosen the 
presidential system. Unfortunately, those countries that have adopted the 
presidential system have tended to be unfriendly to civil liberties as compared 
with countries that have adopted the parliamentary system. His book proves 
that point with analysis and also with statistics. Look at the countries around 
the world, and it is not diffi  cult to fi nd a president for life. It is harder to fi nd 
a prime minister for life.
Buckley argues that presidential systems are more likely to enter a war. 
Presidential systems, as compared with parliamentary systems, have a 50 
percent increase in military budgets.9 (His appendices explain in detail his 
methodology.) It is easier to enter a war if the country already has a strong 
military and a president who does not need parliamentary approval.
America has been an exception. It is one of the freest countries in the world. 
Routinely we are told that America is “exceptional.” Polls show that we owe 
7. Ronald D. Rotunda, Bicentennial Lessons from the Constitutional Convention of 1787, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 589, 621 (1987).
8. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 309 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
9. BUCKLEY, THE ONCE AND FUTURE KING at 180, supra note 1.
Book Review: The Once and Future King: The Rise of Crown Government in America
436 Journal of Legal Education
this to the framers and our Constitution. Buckley’s response: “While that’s a 
nice story, it lacks the added advantage of accuracy.”10 He contends that it is 
not our presidential system that made the diff erence: America is exceptional 
because it has remained free while remaining presidential.
Many of us (I included) favor the system we have lived in all our lives. 
Buckley favors the parliamentary system. Given his Canadian background, 
that is not surprising. Yet Buckley does not prefer the parliamentary system 
because of nostalgia. He has reasons, and this book is his justifi cation. It is 
indeed a powerful justifi cation. Even if this book does not persuade you, it 
is still worth your while to read it so that you see if what you believe merely 
refl ects the fact that you were born in the United States.
Buckley explains that the United States has lived under four constitutions. 
The fi rst was what the Colonies experienced, with crown government and rule 
from Britain, followed by the Articles of Confederation. The second was the 
Constitution of 1787, created to correct the problems under the Articles. It 
was closest to the parliamentary system, with a powerful Congress. The third 
Constitution came with the presidency of Andrew Jackson. Congress held the 
legislative power, but the president’s role expanded. In that era, the protection 
of the separation of powers continued but the president became more powerful: 
We moved into the age of popular democracy with the president in charge, the 
head of state and the head of government.
The fourth Constitution is the one under which we now live. In practice, 
it gives the president many of the powers of a constitutional monarch. The 
media have transformed the president into a “rock star.”11 He alone has the 
moral authority of being elected by the entire country. He creates most of the 
law when his appointees issue regulations, and he unmakes federal statutes 
by refusing to enforce them. He can begin a war without a declaration of war. 
He becomes more powerful because there is only one chief executive while 
there are hundreds of members of Congress. Thus, any bargaining between 
the president and Congress starts with the members fi rst negotiating among 
themselves, on the House or Senate fl oor, and in the press. How and why the 
fourth Constitution developed is the essence of this book.
Most of us are familiar with the Constitutional Convention, yet Buckley’s 
discussion and analysis of that convention adds a new dimension. He shows 
that the framers came much closer to a parliamentary government than many 
of us realized. The delegates debated the method of selecting the president 
on twenty-one diff erent days, taking more than thirty diff erent votes on the 
subject. In sixteen of these, they voted on the method of selecting the president, 
and in six roll call votes (once unanimously) they decided that Congress 
should appoint the president. Once they voted in favor of the state legislatures 
appointing the president. Every time the delegates voted on whether the 
people should elect the president, they voted no. All of these votes show that 
10. Id. at 168, supra note 1.
11. Id. at 11, supra note 1.
437Book Review: The Once and Future King: The Rise of Crown Government in America
the delegates favored a system closer to the parliamentary system, where the 
House of Commons appoints the prime minister. The major diff erence is that 
the president, unlike the prime minister, would have a fi xed term.
However, the fi nal compromise did not give the House of Representatives 
the initial power to appoint the president. It rejected the parliamentary 
system, but the framers thought that what their compromise created was much 
closer to the parliamentary system than one might expect from reading the 
Constitution in light of the subsequent history. The framers—who in so many 
ways were prescient—thought that in the typical situation no candidate could 
muster a majority, so that the House would normally pick the president, with 
each state having one vote. For example, George Mason, one of the framers, 
thought the House of Representatives would elect the president 95 percent of 
the time.
Why the compromise? Buckley examines this question using not only the 
tools of history but also the tools of regression analysis. (He details, with great 
care, his methods of analyzing the many convention votes on this issue, as well 
as others, in three appendices included at the end of the book for those who 
like to read the methodology and the tables.)
In seeking to understand why the delegates accepted a presidential 
system, he examines a number of variables—delegates who were wealthier, 
delegates who were slaveholders, delegates who had been offi  cers during the 
Revolutionary War (they were aristocratic and antidemocratic), delegates 
from states with larger populations, and so forth.
First, he looked at wealth. The wealth of the delegates is relevant on some 
issues, yet he warns, “[a]ny attempt to reduce the delegates’ motives solely to 
economics is crude, and mistaken.”12 It turns out, upon examination of the 
many votes of the method of choosing the chief executive, wealthy delegates 
were 40 percent more likely to support a popularly elected president. One 
might think that those with more wealth would be concerned that candidates 
seeking the presidency would become rabble rousers in an eff ort to win votes 
and secure election. However, it appears they feared the people less than they 
feared Congress.
The offi  cer variable was virtually irrelevant and did not explain any of the 
votes on presidential selection. One might think that this aristocratic class 
would oppose a popular election (not trusting the masses, the vox populi). If so, 
other factors were more important. An aristocrat like Alexander Hamilton, for 
example, favored a strong chief executive because he was a nationalist.
It is common to say that the fi nal product of the debate on selecting the 
president was a compromise between small states (which favored the House 
appointing the president, with each state having one vote) and the larger, 
more populated states. However, Buckley shows that this assertion does not 
fi nd support in any of the votes cast. Small-state delegates stuck together 
and favored the state legislatures appointing the senators but there was no 
12. Id. at 299, supra note 1.
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discernible evidence of a small-state coalition on the method of choosing the 
president.
Our Constitution was conceived in original sin, and that sin was slavery. 
Slave owners certainly were a voting bloc on some issues. After all, we would 
expect them to support the clause that forbids Congress to outlaw the 
importation of slaves prior to 1808.13 However, slave ownership does nothing 
to explain the voting behavior of delegates on the method of selecting the 
president.
In general, delegates who were more nationalistic and wealthier preferred 
a strong presidential system, while less wealthy delegates (who also favored 
states’ rights) supported a quasi-parliamentary system (where Congress 
appointed the president). The result, at the time, was a system by which the 
state legislature picked the electors and the electors picked the president. The 
result, now, is a strong president directly elected by the people.
Yes, there is the veneer of an Electoral College. Our Constitution still says 
that the electors choose the president. However, all the states now provide 
that the people, in the general election, choose the electors, who promise (in 
some cases, state law requires a promise under oath) that they will vote for the 
candidate to whom they are pledged. The faithless elector is an endangered 
species. People do not even know the names of their electors, because the 
ballots list just the presidential candidates. In the old days, the ballot listed the 
electors with the notation “pledged to ___”. Now, even that formality is gone.
 This result is also an option that none of the framers embraced: one person, 
both head of state and head of the government, elected by the people, with all 
the modern powers—a very powerful president whom Congress fi nds diffi  cult 
to check.
Buckley’s statistical analysis is signifi cant and an important contribution 
to the literature. However, it would be misleading to think his book merely 
crunches numbers and wades through hundreds of votes. He also gives us a 
very thorough and entertaining history of the drafting of our Constitution, the 
Canadian Constitution, and the incremental changes in the largely unwritten 
British Constitution.
His historical analysis is fascinating. It also is a fun read. Let us be blunt: 
Reading about law is not often fun. Law review articles seldom read like a 
Jacqueline Susann novel. Buckley’s book is diff erent. He has a snappy prose 
and a delightful style.
Madison, one of our founders, wanted Congress to appoint the president. 
He also wanted the House of Representatives to appoint the senators; he 
wanted seats in the Senate allocated by population and a congressional veto 
over state laws. He lost all of those votes. Still, Madison is now called the 
Father of the Constitution. Buckley’s quotable response: “If he is the Father 
13. U.S. Constitution, Art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
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of the Constitution, however, this is one of those cases, not unknown in the 
delivery rooms, where the child bears little resemblance to the father.”14
In a later chapter, he explains how Madison would have preferred the 
Canadian Constitution. One of the framers of the Canadian Constitution was 
John A. Macdonald, who carefully read Madison’s notes on the Philadelphia 
Convention. In fact, he brought a copy of them to the Quebec conference that 
created Canada’s Constitution. (Later, when a woman asked Macdonald why 
the Constitution did not extend the franchise to females, he said, “Madam, I 
cannot conceive.”15)
Buckley compares the U.S. Constitution as the framers thought it would 
work with the Constitution of today. The Constitution provides that Congress 
proposes legislation and the president vetoes. In modern times, it is the 
president who proposes legislation while Congress “vetoes” (by not enacting 
it). Even when the opposition party controls both houses of Congress, the 
president’s bill is always introduced and Congress conducts hearings and 
considers it even if it does not enact it.
When Congress passes legislation that the president does not like, the 
president can veto legislation. Admittedly, Congress can override, but the 
supermajority requirement of a two-thirds vote in each House makes that hard.
Moreover, in modern times, the president is more likely to sign the 
legislation and, in a signing statement, explain the decision not to comply 
with various provisions. Congress can override a veto but it cannot override a 
signing statement, which becomes more powerful than a veto. Barack Obama, 
as a senator, strongly objected to signing statements, while Barack Obama as 
president uses them with vigor.16 Where you stand depends on where you sit.
The modern president now routinely decides to suspend a law. It is hornbook 
law that the president can refuse to enforce a law (civil or criminal) with the 
claim that it is unconstitutional. It is also a given that the president, as the 
chief legal offi  cer, can decide not to prosecute someone in the criminal courts. 
What is new is that the president now claims to possess (and now exercises) 
power to waive or suspend portions of laws that he insists are constitutional 
but he would like to waive or suspend anyway.
For example, in 1996, President Clinton signed a major welfare overhaul 
that requires some welfare recipients to work. Congress, concerned that a 
future president would not enforce that requirement, stipulated in the law that 
the “workfare” requirements are nonwaivable. President Obama suspended 
14. BUCKLEY, THE ONCE AND FUTURE KING at 60, supra note 1.
15. Id. at 109, supra note 1.
16. Id. at 136-38, supra note 1; Karen Tumulty, Obama Circumvents Laws with ‘Signing statements,’ a Tool 
He Promised to Use Lightly, WASHINGTON POST, June 2, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.
com/politics/obama-circumvents-laws-with-signing-statements-a-tool-he-promised-to-use-
lightly/2014/06/02/9d76d46a-ea73-11e3-9f5c-9075d5508f0a_story.html (last visited October 
9, 2015). Ms. Tumulty is a national political correspondent for The Washington Post, where 
she received the 2013 Toner Prize for Excellence in Political Reporting.
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the workfare requirement. The people who receive the fi nancial benefi t are in 
no mood to complain, nor would they have standing to do so.
Congress, in enacting the Aff ordable Care Act, scheduled various provisions 
to go into eff ect in 2014. The law delegates much authority to the executive 
branch, but there is no authority to waive these provisions. Nonetheless, 
the president waived them until 2015 simply by announcing that he was not 
going to enforce the penalties that the law provided. President Obama or his 
appointees have granted over 1,000 waivers.17 We know that nearly 25 percent 
of the waivers went to labor unions that supported the Aff ordable Care Act.18 
The power to suspend laws is a power to help one’s friends and hurt one’s 
enemies. Many in Congress, including members of the president’s own party, 
objected to the president’s power to waive the law.19 He did it anyway. Thus 
far, federal courts have rejected on standing grounds anyone who complains 
above the waiver.
As the president has increased his power over the past several decades, 
Congress has been complicit. It routinely enacts laws broadly delegating 
power to the president or his appointees, with the instructions to make 
regulations having the force of law. The only restriction is that the regulations 
should promote “public convenience and necessity,”20 or should prevent 
“unfair methods of competition.”21 Or the secretary of Agriculture should 
set prices that he or she “deems to be in the public interest and feasible in 
view of the current consumptive demand.”22 The regulators are not members 
of Congress but unelected bureaucrats. These presidential appointees never 
come before the voters. They issue their rules without the cumbersome and 
irksome congressional procedure, which the framers imposed to protect our 
rights. The fact that we already live in a highly regulated world serves to 
magnify their power.
17. BUCKLEY, THE ONCE AND FUTURE KING at 139, supra note 1.
18. Id. at 139, supra note 1.
19. E.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, On the Health-Care Mandate, Obama Reaches Beyond the Law, WASHINGTON 
POST, July 18, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/on-the-health-care-mandate-
obama-reaches-beyond-the-law/2013/07/18/d442aefc-efb4-11e2-a1f9-ea873b7e0424_story.
html (last visited October 9, 2015).
20. E.g., Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Public Service Commission, 341 U.S. 
329, 71 S.Ct. 777, 95 L.Ed. 993 (1951) (state commission order requiring interstate natural gas 
company to obtain certifi cate of public convenience and necessity held valid).
21. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE 
AND PROCEDURE §§ 4.7(b), 4.8(b) (West Thomson Reuters 5th ed. 2012). See discussion at 
BUCKLEY, THE ONCE AND FUTURE KING at 131-32, supra note 1.
22. Uelman v. Freeman, 267 F.Supp. 842, 846 (E.D.Wis.) aff ’d sub nom. Uelmen v. Freeman, 388 
F.2d 308 (7th Cir.1967), quoting 7 U.S.C. § 602.
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The president also issues executive orders that look like legislation but need 
no congressional input. Buckley quotes Democratic presidential adviser Paul 
Begala: “Stroke of the pen. Law of the Land. Kinda cool.”23 Yes, it is.
For example, President Obama recently issued several executive orders that 
overhaul immigration. He justifi es these orders as part of his “prosecutorial 
discretion.” However, his orders do not relate to criminal prosecutions. He 
does not claim that the governing laws are unconstitutional. Instead, he says 
that because Congress has not changed the law, he “changed the law.”24
These lengthy orders look like legislation. They are pages long, with 
sections, subsections, provisos and eff ective dates. I favor immigration reform 
(both my parents came from the old country), and I hope that Congress will 
do that. Nonetheless, it never occurred to me that the president, on his own, 
could order federal employees to issue several million Social Security cards to 
undocumented aliens—particularly when a host of opinions from the Offi  ce of 
Legal Counsel and the Department of Justice say explicitly that the president 
has no power to “suspend” law. The president and the Department of Justice 
ignored these earlier opinions.25 (Apparently, it never occurred to the president 
or the Department of Justice either, until November of 2014. Before that, the 
president iterated and reiterated26 that he had no executive power to change 
the immigration laws.27)
23. BUCKLEY, THE ONCE AND FUTURE KING at 131, supra note 1.
24. “I Just Took an Action to Change the Law,” November 25, 2014. http://www.weeklystandard.
com (last visited October 9, 2015).
25. The Department of Justice and the Offi  ce of Legal Counsel have repeatedly opined that the 
president cannot suspend laws. For example, the OLC concluded that “the idea that the 
President has the authority to refuse to enforce a law which he believes is unconstitutional 
was familiar to the Framers. The Constitution qualifi es the President’s veto power in the 
legislative process, but it does not impose a similar qualifi cation on his authority to take care 
that the laws are faithfully executed.” Issues Raised by Section 102(c)(2) of H.R. 3792, 14 OP. OFF. 
LEGAL COUNSEL 37, 51, 1990 WL 488469, *10 (1990). The Offi  ce of Legal Counsel, in a 1980 
opinion, made quite clear that the president has no suspension power:
The President has no ‘dispensing power.’ (emphasis added) . . . [T]he 17th century dispute 
between Parliament and the Stuart kings over the so-called ‘dispensing power’ [is] 
directly relevant to the questions you have raised. The history of that dispute was well-
known to the Framers of the Constitution, and it is clear that they intended to deny 
our President any discretionary power of the sort that the Stuarts claimed. 
 The Attorney General’s Duty to Defend & Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable Legislation, 4A U.S. OP. 
OFF. LEGAL COUNSEL 55, 57, 1980 WL 20999, *3, *4 (1980).
26. Michael D. Shear, For Obama, Executive Order on Immigration Would Be a Turnabout, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
17, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/18/us/by-using-executive-order-on-immigration-
obama-would-reverse-long-held-stance.html (last visited October 9, 2015).
27. The Department of Justice’s Offi  ce of Legal Counsel issued an opinion letter on which 
the president relied. http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/fi les/olc/opinions/attachments/
2014/11/20/2014-11-19-auth-prioritize-removal.pdf (last visited October 9, 2015).However, 
that letter never explains why assigning Social Security cards has anything to do with 
setting priorities of deporting undocumented aliens. The letter never deals with the 
president’s own justifi cation: “Congress has failed.” http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
offi  ce/2014/11/20/remarks-president-address-nation-immigration (last visited October 9, 
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Is the road to crown government irreversible, or can we at least backtrack 
a bit? Buckley off ers several ideas, some of which are not going to happen. 
We are unlikely to change our Constitution, just as we are unlikely to make 
impeachments easier.28 However, Congress can delegate legislation with 
standards much more specifi c than “public convenience and necessity.” 
Courts could be more serious in requiring a delegation standard that is not so 
open-ended. Nothing prevents the president from regularly appearing before 
Congress to answer questions, as the prime minister does. Buckley quotes 
British political scientist Harold Laski, who said, “No better method has ever 
been devised for keeping administration up to the mark.”
Whether or not the road is irreversible, it will be an enjoyable journey to 
know of its past, its present, and its possible future by reading The Once and 
Future King: The Rise of Crown Government in America.
2015). The president relies on this letter, but it says: “[A] general policy of non-enforcement 
that forecloses the exercise of case-by-case discretion poses ‘special risks’ that the agency has 
exceeded the bounds of its enforcement discretion.” The president’s order is a general policy 
of nonenforcement for several million people, and much more (e.g., Social Security cards, 
issuing work permits) than nonenforcement. The opinion letter never even cites or tries to 
distinguish its early opinion letters to the contrary, cited in footnote 5, supra.
28. He provokingly says, “Congress should impeach and remove presidents often. When their 
policies fail, when they are touched with scandal, or for no reason, just for the spirit of the 
thing.” BUCKLEY, THE ONCE AND FUTURE KING at 289, supra note 1.
